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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TITANIUM METALS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SPACE METALS, INC., a
corporation, and VALLEY BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

Case No.
13474

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in contract brought by Respondent,
an out-of-state seller of goods, against Appellant, Valley
Bank and Trust Company, enforcing payments of amounts
due and owing under Letters of Credit issued by Appellant Bank.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, tried the case
without a jury and the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson
rendered a judgment in favor of the Respondent and
1
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against the Appellant for the sum of fifty-four thousand
one hundred thirty-two and 72/100 ($54,132.72) dollars
and costs of Court incurred.

RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower Court's
decision in favor of Respondent and against Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, although not disputing the Statement
of Facts as set forth in Appellant's brief, does feel that
Appellant has omitted some very relevant and important
facts which should be brought to the attention of this
Court. Respondent further feels that Appellant has misinterpreted many of the facts contained in its Statement
of Facts, and therefore is making a Statement of Facts as
Respondent finds them.
Respondent, Titanium Metals Corporation of America, is engaged in the business of selling metal products
to manufacturing concerns throughout the nation. Its
business offices are located in N e w York, N e w York. Prior
to May 25, 1968, Titanium was contacted by the Defendant, Space Metals, Inc., a Utah corporation and was asked
to supply Space Metals, Inc. with substantial quantities of
titanium fines for use in Space Metals' Utah operation.
During the early stages of negotiation, Titanium informed
Space Metals that in order for the requested sales to be
made on credit, Space Metals must secure from its bank,
Valley Bank & Trust Company, letters of credit, so that
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Titanium would be assured of payment for any and all
goods which would be sold to Space Metals.
After being approached by Space Metals with this
request, the Appellant, Valley Bank & Trust Company,
agreed to comply and sent to Titanium a letter of credit
(Exhibit 1-P) which stated in part:
W e have approved a fifteen thousand ($15,000.00)
dollar line of credit for one of our very reliable
customers, Space Metals, Inc. This line is for the
specific purpose of covering invoices from your
company. This letter of guaranty is good until
August 15, 1968.
Relying upon this letter, Titanium made numerous
shipments of titanium fines to Space Metals during the
period of May 28, 1968 to August 15, 1968. During this
period, the sales made by Titanium to Space Metals did
not exceed fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) dollars. As soon
as the ordered material had been shipped from the Titanium
plant, an invoice was sent directly to Valley Bank & Trust
indicating the amount of titanium purchased, the purchase
price, and the due date of this purchase price.
Each of the invoices which Titanium mailed to Valley
Bank contained the following stamped legend in the lower
left-hand corner: "Please remit to: Titanium Metals
Corporation of America, P.O. Box 64049, Terminal Annex, Los Angeles, California 90054".
The Appellant, upon receipt of the invoices, utilized
the following procedure in connection with each letter of
credit. Upon receipt of the invoices, Valley Bank would
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immediately prepare an advice, each of which contained a
description of the invoice and specifically identified it as
a "sales draft" or "draft". This identification was typed
directly on the face of the Bank's advice. (Exhibits 5-P
to 10-P).
On the due date of the invoices, a Cashier's Check was
drawn in payment thereof and the invoice was stamped
"Paid" by Valley Bank & Trust. The check drawn on
Valley Bank together with the stamped invoice and a pink
copy of the Bank's advice with the description " W e enclose
in payment our draft (number of cashier's check)" (Emphasis added} would then be mailed by Appellant to the
P. O. Box as directed by the sales draft. (Exhibit 4-P)
Space Metals, needing additional supplies of the
titanium fines, induced Valley Bank & Trust Company,
through its assistant vice-president, to send another letter
of credit dated October 8, 1968 to Titanium (Exhibit 2-P)
which stated in part:
W e have agreed with Mr. Williams of Space
Metals, Inc. to pay all of your collection drafts
upon presentation or due date until December 3 1 ,
1968.
Again Titanium continued to make shipments of the
metallic material to Space Metals and as each shipment
was made, sales drafts representing the shipment of titanium fines were sent to Valley Bank & Trust Company.
Within the due date specified upon each sales draft Titanium would again receive a cashier's check from Valley
Bank & Trust for the amount of the sales draft together
with the pink copy of the Bank's advice and the invoice

4
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stamped "Paid". The cost of the titanium fines purchased
during this period was nineteen thousand ($19,000.00)
dollars.
Finally on March 3, 1969, Titanium received a third
and final letter of credit (Exhibit 3-P) from Valley Bank
& Trust Company which bore a striking resemblance to
the second letter of credit sent by Valley Bank & Trust
Company. This third letter stated in part:
W e have agreed with Mr. Williams of Space
Metals, Inc. to pay all of your collection drafts upon
presentation or due dates for a period of ninety
days from the date of this letter.
Titanium continued its normal practice of making
shipments to Space Metals without objection by Appellant, simultaneously mailing sales drafts to Valley Bank
& Trust Company for payment. Titanium submitted to
Valley Bank & Trust a series of seven (7) sales drafts
during the period covered by the third letter of credit,
summarized as follows:
SALES DRAFT
(INVOICE) NO.

69-181
69-188
69-199
69-205
69-219
69-223
69-234

VALLEY BANK'S
ADVICE NO.

1257
1260
1311
1310
1326
1325
1324

AMOUNT

DUE DATE

1,438.50
12,261.50
4,110.00
9,500.00
6,850.00
6,850.00
4,110.00

4/18/69
4/27/69
5/4/69
5/11/69
5/24/69
5/27/69
6/1/69

(Exhibits 4-P through 10-P
Of the above sales drafts, Valley Bank sent a cashier's check for one thousand four hundred thirty-eight and
50/100 ($1,438.50) dollars accompanied by the first ad5
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vice (1257) to Titanium which bore the following notation thereon: "We enclose in payment our draft —
CC006923" and the invoice stamped "Paid". (Exhibit
4-P) N o notice of nonacceptance, dishonor, or nonpayment of the other six sales drafts was sent by Valley Bank
to Titanium on or before the due dates, but the remaining
six advices were finally returned on November 19, 1969
to Titanium attached to the sales draft originally sent
with the notation: " W e are returning herewith unpaid
— ll/^^^^
During the entire period covered by the letters of
credit, the Appellant, pursuant to an agreement with Space
Metals, and after being notified by receipt of Respondent's
sales draft that a shipment of titanium fines had been
made, had perfected its security interest in all of the fines
shipped to Space Metals.
The Trial Court in Paragraph 6 of its Findings of
Fact concluded that the invoices sent to Valley Bank by
Titanium satisfied the requirements of the letters of credit
in that Valley Bank waived its requirement for a separate
draft to be attached to the invoice,
. . . by its failure to specifically require a draft
to be sent in the usual form, by issuing and forwarding its drafts purchased by Space Metals, Inc.
totaling more than $19,000.00 on a similar letter
of credit covering an earlier period, by its acknowledgement on the advice that the invoice copies
with demand to remit payment to the sender were
"sales drafts", by its failure to return the invoice
copies upon receipt, or to notify it would not pay
unless drafts suitable for its banking purposes
accompanied the invoices, and by its retention of
6
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the invoices after the due dates and its failure to
gi\e notice of nonpayment until more than five
months after the due date. (R-115)
At no time did Valley Bank & Trust Company notify
Titanium that the procedure which it was utilizing in the
sending of invoices to Valley Bank was improper and
that such procedure should be remedied or altered to
conform to a different banking procedure and particularly that formal commercial drafts should be presented in order to collect for the shipments. In fact, an
officer of Valley Bank & Trust on examination by Judge
Jeppson, admitted that there was absolutely no difference in the way the Bank handled an invoice as opposed
to a draft.
BY THE COURT:
Q. Mr. Anderson, you have specified your duty
at the bank where they received an invoice or a
draft on these letters one and two. W h a t is the
difference in how you would handle those whether
it was a draft or an invoice?
A. Actually, they were handled in the same manner. There's no difference.
Q. You contacted the customer and told him you
had it?
A. Right, as a courtesy we handled them in either
instance.
Q. Did you ever write a letter to Titanium Metals
and advise them that their invoice had been received, but since it wasn't a draft you would see
if your customer wanted to instruct you on what to
do with it^ or something like that.
A.

N o sir.
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Q. You didn't ever point out to them the difference.
A. N o sir.
Q.

In the two that you say exist now?

A. They are a large company and they have been
operating under the premise of sending invoices
in, and as I understand, there was no change on
their part. However, on Griffs part, he was contemplating a larger letter of credit and this type
of thing and he was trying to determine ways of
raising capital for growth of his company.
Q. But how did you let this company know, the
Titanium Company, that your procedure was going
to be different, that they had to send in an invoice
if you were to be liable, I mean a draft?
A. They didn't communicate with us and we
didn't communicate with them because as far as
our customer and us we had not resolved anything
so there was no difference. (R 178 & R 179)
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

WAIVER, I N THE INSTANT ACTION,
NEED N O T BE SPECIFICALLY PLEAD A N D
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT I N
F I N D I N G T H A T APPELLANT WAIVED
STRICT COMPLIANCE W I T H THE TERMS
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT.
Appellant has incorrectly taken the position that it
was Plaintiff's obligation to specifically plead waiver at
the Trial Court level in order to sustain the findings of
the Trial Court both as a matter of fact and as a matter
of law that the Appellant waived strict compliance with
8
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the terms of the letter of credit. In support of this position,
Appellant relies on Rule 8C of The Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure entitled "Affirmative Defenses". This rule
states in part that:
In pleading to a preceeding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively . . . waiver, and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense. Id. [Emphasis added}
It is entirely inappropriate for Appellant to rely upon
this Rule inasmuch as one of the requirements in order
for the Rule to apply is that there must be a "pleading to
a preceeding pleading". This is certainly not the case in
the instant action inasmuch as Respondent (Plaintiff),
was the party who instituted the action and had no obligation whatsoever to plead to a preceding pleading. The
Rule is specifically limited to situations involving the
pleading of waiver as an affirmative defense. Waiver in
this action is not an affirmative defense but rather merely
a part of Plaintiff's initial cause of action against the Defendant.
For purposes of clarification it should also be brought
to the Court's attention that the word "avoidance" carries
with it substantially the same meaning as "affirmative
defense". In Mahaiwe Bank v. Douglass, 31 Conn. 175,
the word, "avoidance" was defined as the allegation or
statement of new matter, in opposition to a former pleading, which, admitting the facts alleged in such former
pleadings shows cause why they should not have their
ordinary legal affect. It is apparent that the terms "affirmative defense" and "avoidance" are synonymous and in no
9
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way change application of Rule 8C to situations other than
those situations which involve the pleading of affirmative
defenses.
Appellant cites two cases in support of its position
that Respondent was required to plead waiver in order to
prevail in a trial on the merits. The cases upon which
Appellant relies are not applicable to the issue in question
inasmuch as both Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Remay,
58 Idaho 302, 72 P.2d 859 (1937) and Rudd v. Rogerson,
424 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1967) are cases which involve an
interpretation of Rule 8C as it applies to the pleading of
waiver as an affirmative defense.
The record in this case shows that although neither
waiver nor estoppel was pleaded by Respondent
(Defendant)., he relied on both as defenses to the
charge that he was in default in his payments and
that he had removed the automobile from California without written consent. These are special
defenses and evidence thereof is inadmissable under
a general denial. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,
supra, at 862.
As can be easily seen these cases do not fit the facts
of the instant case. The cases which have ruled on the
issue of waiver have concluded that there is no obligation
upon the part of the Plaintiff to specifically plead waiver
in order to prevail in a trial on the merits. In the case of
West v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 10 Utah 442,
37 P. 685 (1894) the Plaintiff owned certain property
which was destroyed by fire and an action was brought
to recover the value of the property destroyed under an
insurance policy issued thereon by the Defendant. In

10
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deciding the question as to whether or not evidence related to waiver should have been admitted, the Court
stated:
Where a pleading contains an allegation of the
performance of a condition, it is not absolutely
necessary to allege a waiver, because proof thereof
is admissable under the general allegation. 2 May,
Ins. §589; Insurance Company v. Dougherty, 102
Pa. St. 568. Id. at 687.
Similarly, Respondent's pleadings contain general
allegations regarding the contractual obligations arising
under the Appellant's letters of credit. Respondent further
alleged that it fulfilled the condition imposed upon it to
ship goods and that the Appellant failed to fulfill the
condition imposed upon it to pay for such goods after they
had been shipped. Quite clearly then Respondent too
alleged the performance of conditions in its pleading
thereby eliminating any need to specifically allege waiver.
Cases in other jurisdictions have also reached similar
conclusions with regard to the issue of whether or not a
Plaintiff has an obligation to specifically plead waiver. In
Pfaffengut v. Export Ins. Co. of New York et ah 212
N . W . 518 (N.D. 1927), an action involving two cases, one
brought by the Plaintiff to recover on an automobile insurance policy, and the other to determine the rights of
the Defendants in and to a certain draft issued to the
Plaintiff by one of the Defendants in settlement of Plaintiff's claim for loss, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff had no obligation to raise the question of waiver and
stated:
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This brings us to the question of waiver. Defendant first urges that it has pleaded an avoidance of
the policy in its answers; that Plaintiff failed to
reply setting up waiver on the part of the Defendant; and so cannot now rely upon waiver. Under
the circumstances, waiver was not required to be
pleaded. (Citations). Id. at 520
On the basis of this case the Appellant is incorrect in
contending that there was a requirement for Respondent
to plead waiver before Appellant could be held liable
under the terms of its letter of credit.
Appellant is also in error in contending that waiver
was not plead and therefore the pleadings did not conform to the proof offered. The Utah Supreme Court is in
accord with Respondent's position that where a party
raises an objection that there is a fatal variance between
the pleadings and the proof, such objection cannot be
taken for the first time on appeal. This was the holding in
the case of Mumjord v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co., 64 Utah 24, 40, 228 P. 206 (1924). In this case the
Plaintiff sued Defendant for damages on an indemnity
bond in which the Union Livestock Commission Company
of Ogden, Utah was principal and the Defendant therein
was surety. Plaintiff's Complaint alleged that the drafts
were drawn on the Livestock Company with its knowledge
and the Court found that such drafts were drawn with the
knowledge "and consent" of the Livestock Company. The
Utah Supreme Court held that the variance between the
pleadings and the proof did not justify a reversal.
W e have already arrived at a conclusion that the
facts found by the Court are sustained by the evidence, and while we do not conceed that there is a
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material variance in view of authorities heretofore referred to, yet, even if the Complaint were
defective in the respect mentioned, there being
no objection in the Court below, the defect in this
Court should be held immaterial and be disregarded. (Citation) Id. a.t 212.
Respondent, in its Motion for New Trial (R-107)
made no mention that counsel was taken by surprise in
that waiver had not been plead, nor was the argument
even advanced that no opportunity was given to dispute
the facts proving waiver until the time that this appeal
was taken.
From all of the above authorities and holdings it is
extremely clear that waiver in the instant action need not
be specifically plead by Respondent and that the Trial
Court was correct in finding that Appellant waived strict
compliance with the terms of the letter of credit in issue,
such finding being based entirely based entirely on the
evidence presented at trial in support of Respondent's
position that Appellant was liable under the terms of
Appellant's letter of credit.
POINT

II

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED T O T H E
TRIAL COURT CLEARLY SUPPORTS ITS
FINDINGS T H A T STRICT COMPLIANCE
W I T H THE TERMS OF THE LETTER OF
CREDIT WAS WAIVED BY APPELLANT.
Appellant maintains that there was no evidence presented to the trial court to support a finding of waiver.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The record is

13
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replete with statements by bank officials which clearly
support the lower court's finding that the Bank did in
fact waive strict compliance with the terms of its letter
of credit in issue.
Appellant cites in its brief the case of Phoenix Ins.
Company v. Heath et al, 90 Utah 87, 61 P.2d 308 (1936).
This case involved a Plaintiff insurance company who had
instructed its agents, later to be named Defendants, to
reduce the amount of an insurance policy which Plaintiff
had issued upon a certain building. Upon receipt of this
definite instruction to cancel promptly, the Defendant
agents wrote to the Plaintiff insurance company and asked
it to reconsider the reduction. The Plaintiff immediately
responded by letter and affirmed its original directive.
Just prior to the time that Plaintiff's letter was received
by Defendants, the insured building was destroyed. The
Plaintiffs insurance company sued the Defendants for the
difference between the amount it was required to pay to
the insured and the amount it would have been required
to pay had the Defendants followed the directives contained in Plaintiff's letters. The Defendants contended
that Plaintiff's action constituted a waiver of its demand
to reduce the policy. The Court found in this case that
no waiver was proven because there was no proof offered
to show that it was Plaintiff's intention to reconsider their
original order. The Court in finding for the Plaintiff
found, 1) that the agents did not promptly request reconsideration; 2) that the company did not reconsider or reeximine the matter; 3) that the company did not delay in
making its reply to the agents and 4) that the company
immediately reaffirmed its request for cancellation.
14
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The facts of the above case upon which Appellant
heavily relies, are very different from the facts of the case
involving Valley Bank & Trust. Moreover, Appellant
has omitted an important part of the definition which is
extremely relevant to the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of waiver.
W h a t the Court in fact stated was:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. (Citation) T o constitute a waiver,
there must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly made,
although it may be express or implied. (Citations)
Id!, at 312. (Emphasis added}
It should be noted that the Court in this case not only
defines waiver but also states that waiver may be express,
or implied from the conduct of the party against whom a
waiver is being asserted. The instant action involves
three (3) letters of credit and a failure to pay or honor
obligations under the third and final letter of credit by
the Appellant. The period of time covered by these three
letters of credit ran from May 28, 1968 to June of 1969,
a period of more than one full year during which time Respondent continuously relied upon Appellant's guarantee
of the credit of Space Metals. During that lengthy period
of time, Defendant Valley Bank & Trust took no affirmative action whatsoever to inform Respondent that any of
the procedures being utilized was incorrect. There is a
total absence of any statement in the record made by any
bank official indicating that the bank intended a change
of procedure on the part of Titanium, its agents and/or
representatives.
15
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In Phoenix supra, the insurance company attempted
immediate action to definitely define its position and inform its agents that it did in fact require compliance with
its original directive. In the instant case, Valley Bank &
Trust never, during the entire period in question, defined
its position, expressed any discontent over the procedure
which was being used by Titanium in informing Valley
Bank & Trust of the amounts due and owing by Space
Metals and never requested Titanium to conduct itself
differently.
Respondent does not disagree with the statement of
the law in Phoenix but Respondent does definitely wish
to bring to the Court's attention that the facts in Phoenix
are so different from the facts of the case in question that
this case only gives the Court an indication as to what
activity does not amount to a waiver.
A waiver may be express or implied, it may be
established by an express statement or agreement,
or by acts or conduct from which an intention to
waive may reasonably be inferred . . . An implied
waiver may arise where a person has pursued such
a course of conduct as to evidence an intention to
waive a right or where his conduct is inconsistent
with any other intention than to waive it. Waiver
may be inferred from conduct or acts putting one
off his gard and leading him to believe that a right
has been waived. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and
Waiver §160. [Emphasis added)
In the case of Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 176
Wash. 36, 28 P.2d 310, 314 (1934) an action was brought
to recover the full amount of a life insurance policy made
payable at the death of the insured name therein. The
16
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Court, in concluding that the Appellant insurance company had waived strict compliance with the terms of the
policy regarding notice, treated the question of "implied
waiver'' by stating that:
An implied waiver may arise where one party has
pursued such a course of conduct as to evidence an
intention to waive a right or where his conduct
is inconsistent with any other intention than to
waive it . . . A waiver is unilateral and arises by
the intentional relinquishment of a right, or by
neglect to insist upon it ....... (Citations) Id. at 314
{Emphasis added}
Clearly, in the present case, the trial court looked at
the conduct of the Appellant as evidenced by the record
and determined that the evidence with which it was presented was sufficient to support both a finding of fact and
a conclusion of law that Appellant Bank, Valley Bank
& Trust had waived strict compliance with the terms of its
letter of credit.
In the Findings of Fact, Paragraph 6, the Court did
not generalize but specifically enumerated the acts of
Valley Bank's offices which supported the general findings and the conclusions of law. These specifics are supported in the record by the following testimony. T h e trial
court specifically found that Appellant had waived the
necessity for a separate draft by "its failure to specifically
require drafts to be sent in the usual form". (R 170 &
R 171)
The bank officer further testified that at no time was
Titanium ever advised that the procedure which it was
17
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following was incorrect or not in accord with the normal
banking procedures utilized by Valley Bank & Trust.
(R 178 & R 179)
The Court further concluded that Valley Bank had
waived strict compliance by "issuing and forwarding its
drafts purchased by Space Metals totaling more than
$19,000.00 on a similar letter of credit covering an earlier
period, as evidenced by the first invoice shipment covered
by the letter of credit". (R. 144) {Emphasis added]
Similarly the Court also concluded that Valley Bank
waived strict compliance "by its acknowledgement on the
advice that the invoice copies with the demand to remit
payment to the center were 'sales drafs' ". (R 142) In
further support of this finding, the record contains testimony from an officer of Appellant Bank that the Bank
identified the invoice as a sales draft. (R170, 171, 172,
139 & 140)
And finally the trial court concluded that Appellant
had waived strict compliance by its failure to return the
invoice copies upon receipt or to notify it would not pay
unless drafts suitable for its banking purposes accompanied the invoices and by its retention of the invoices
after the due dates and its failure to give notice of nonpayment until more than five months after the due date.
(R142, 193 & 194)
The record clearly shows that there was more than
substantial evidence upon which the trial court relied in
entering its finding that Appellant had waived strict com18
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pliance with the terms of the leter of credit. The conduct
entered into by Appellant amounted to an implied waiver
as defined in Reynolds, supra. Respondent relied on the
conduct of Appellant and Appellant must be held responsible for its failure to insist upon strict compliance
with the terms of its letter of credit, and by reason of such
conduct has waived any separate right to be relieved of
liability because separate formal commercial drafts were
not sent separately with the sales invoices.

POINT

III

T H E ISSUER OF A LETTER OF CREDIT
MAY WAIVE STRICT COMPLIANCE W I T H
T H E TERMS THEREOF A N D IS THEREBY
ESTOPPED FROM LATER CLAIMING EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY.
Article Five of The Uniform Commercial Code entitled "Letters of Credit", has been adopted in Utah and
is found in §70A-5-101 et seq. of the Utah Code Ann.
(1953). These statutes should be utilized by the Court
in assessing the merits of Defendant's appeal, and Respondent would particularly like to call the Court's attention to the basic definitional sections of that chapter and
also to the official comments made on those particular
sections by the drafters of The Uniform Commercial Code.
Section 70A-5-102 states that:
(1) This chapter applies
(a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit
requires a documentary draft or a documentary demand for payment; and . . .
19
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(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other
person if the credit is not within subparagraphs (a) or (b) but conspicuously states that
it is a letter of credit or is conspicuously so
entitled . . .
(3) This article deals with some but not all of
the rules and concepts of letters of credit as such
rules or concepts have developed prior to this act
or may hereafter develop. The fact that this chapter states a rule does not by itself require, imply
or negate application of the same or a converse
rule to the situation not provided for or to a person
not specified by this article. Id.
The official comments to paragraph (1) (a) particularly state that:
Paragraph (1) (a) is applicable to banks and states
whenever the promise to honor is conditioned on
presentation of any piece of paper, the transaction
is within this article . . . Id.
In commenting on subsection (3), the drafters of the
law realized that the concept of letters of credit is still
growing and in many instances unexplored. I t was their
intention to leave the application of Chapter Five dealing
with letters of credit very broad in scope and allow the
Courts to look into the facts surrounding each individual
transaction and then apply the law in existence at the time
of is decision.
Subsection (3) recognizes that in the present state
of the law and variety of practices as to letters of
credit, no statute can effectively or wisely codify
all the possible letters of credit without stiltifying
further development of this useful financing device. The more important areas not covered by this
article revolve around the question of when docu-
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ments in fact and in law do or do not comply with
the terms of the credit. In addition, such minor
matters as the absence of expiration dates and the
effect of extending shipment but not expiration
dates are also left untouched for future adjudication. The rules embodied in this article can be
viewed as those expressing the fundamental theories underlying letters of credit. For this reason,
the second sentence of subsection (3) makes explicit the Court's power to apply a particular rule
by analogy in cases not within its terms, or to refrain from doing so. Under §1-102 such application is to follow the cannon of liberal interpretation to promote underlying purposes and policies.
Since the law of letters of credit is still developing,
conscious use of that cannon and attention to
fundamental theory by the Court are particularly
appropriate. Id. {Emphasis added}
In defining a letter of credit, section 70A-5-103 Utah
Code Ann. (1953) states that:
(1) In this article unless the context otherwise
requires,
(a) "credit" or "letter of credit" means an
engagement by a bank or other person made
at the request of a customer and of a kind
within the scope of this article (§5-102) that
the issuer will honor drafts or other demands
for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit. A credit may be
either revokable or irrevokable. The engagement may be either an agreement to honor
or a statement that the bank or other person
is authorized to honor.
(b) A "documentary draft" or a "documentary demand for payment" is one honor of
which is conditioned upon the presentation
of a document or documents. "Document"
21
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means any paper including document of title,
security, invoice, certificate, notice of default
and the like . . . Id. {Emphasis added]
As can be easily seen from the above-cited statutes
it was the intention of the framers of the law to draft a
statute involving letters of credit which would be broad
enough to encompass the developing commercial concepts to which letters of credit are applicable. In order to
do this, the statutory language was intentionally kept extremely broad and the Courts were assigned the task of
interpreting such, and were given great discretionary
power to determine whether or not the transaction fell
within the terms of Chapter Five of the Uniform Commercial Code. The only caveat or restriction placed upon
the interpreting Court is that its decisions should be in
accord with the fundamental theory and underlying purposes and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code,
namely, promotion of easy, uncomplicated, and economically beneficial commercial transactions.
With the above statutory directives kept in mind,
this Court must decide whether or not Appellant did, in
fact, through its normal banking procedures, waive strict
compliance with the terms of its letters of credit issued
on March 3, 1969. Respondent would refer the Court to
the case of Consolidated Sales Co,, Inc. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va. 307. 68 S.E.2d 652 (1952), a case
which is almost an exact duplicate of the case at bar. In
this action, the Consolidated Sales Company, Inc. sued the
Bank of Hampton Roads to recover the amount for which
Defendant sold certain electrical appliances to a retail
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dealer on Defendant's credit. Recovery of the sums sued
for was denied by the trial court and Plaintiff appealed.
From the facts of the case it was found, that the
Defendant bank had issued to the Plaintiff a letter of credit
guaranteeing the payment for goods purchased on open
account by one of the bank's customers. Upon the submission by the Plaintiff to the bank of drafts accompanied
by invoices representing the goods which should be
shipped, the bank promised remittance upon receipt of
that documentation.
Plaintiff began to make sales to the bank's customer
and attached the requested draft to each of the first seven
(7) invoices submitted to the bank for payment. Thereafter, an additional eighteen to twenty shipments were
made by the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff received payment
for such by the bank upon the mere submission of invoices
alone. In treating the question of waiver by the bank of
strict compliance, the Court agreed with the trial court
which had held that the Bank, by its conduct had waived
strict compliance with the terms of the letters of credit.
It definitely appears that on all of the numerous
shipments made subsequent to the first seven, no
draft was sent with the invoices. The trial court
held that by continuing to make payment upon
receipt of the invoices alone, the hank had waived
the provision in the letter which specified and
had theretofore required that a draft accompany
each invoice. With that conclusion we agree. Id.
at 656 [Emphasis added]
The record is filled with references made by bank
officers to the fact that the bank itself had on each occasion
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typed an advice which described the invoice as a draft. If
this alone is not sufficient to sustain the finding of the
trial court, then the Court's decision in Consolidated Sales
Company, supra, should be. Appellant had, for the period
of over one year, induced Respondent, by its letters of
credit, to make shipments to Space Metals, Inc. On all
occasions, Respondent submitted to Appellant invoices
which were described by Appellant itself as "sales drafts''.
Appellant even went so far as to pay the first sales draft
which it received under the third letter of credit. (Exhibit 4-P) As set out in the Statement of Facts, Appellant
then belatedly returned the remaining six sales drafts
(Invoices) unpaid.
The question of the necessity of an accompanying
draft was also treated in the case of Richard v. Royal Bank
of Canada, 23 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1928). In this case, the
Plaintiffs agreed to pay the bank, the issuer of the letters
of credit, any amounts that they had paid out, if payments
were made under the conditions embodied in the letters
of credit, and, if the conditions had been strictly adhered
to. The letters of credit provided that the shipments must
be completed and the drafts drawn on certain dates. The
drafts were to be accompanied by certain documents. The
bank, upon receipt of the documents, made payments
although no drafts were presented to Plaintiff. Judge
Agustus N . Hand affirmed the trial court's decision and
stated that:
The letters of credit did not require the drawing
of drafts. They assumed that they would be drawn,
but, had they been drawn by a seller of iron, the
Defendants, who were financing Fogle in his purchases, could not have sued the drawers thereof.
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T o be sure, the drafts would have served as vouchers, but the receipts furnished were as good. Likewise, as the weight certificates, the weight is given
on the invoices, and approved by the person designated to approve the weight certificates. N o possible purpose could be served by having separate
documents, although such appeared to be more
customary. Id. at 433.
It is clear from the above-cited authorities that Appellant, by reason of its very definite conduct, had voluntarily
changed its position and had waived any requirement of
strict compliance under the terms of its letter of credit.
In so doing, the Appellant cannot now come to this Court
and assert that it had been wronged by reason of Respondent's alleged failure to comply with banking procedures which Appellant, for over a period of one year,
never felt important enough to enforce or even discuss
with Respondent. Consolidated Sales Co., supra, and Richards, supra, both stand for the proposition that technical
objections raised by the issuer of a letter of credit will not
be sufficient to justify a conclusion that the issuer should
not be held responsible for payments guaranteed by reason of its own letters of credit.
POINT

IV

A LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL BE CONSTRUED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
T O THE RECIPIENT THEREOF AND IN
CASES OF AMBIGUITY THE AMBIGUITY
SHALL BE RESOLVED I N FAVOR OF THE
RECIPIENT.
It has been consistently the practice of the courts,
when faced with the interpretation of a letter of credit,
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to interpret such letter in a light most favorable to the
recipient. In the case of Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1917) the trial court
granted a Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of
the confirming bank and denied a similar motion made
by the beneficiary of a letter of credit. In finding that the
beneficiary had in fact complied with the terms of the
letter of credit, the Court gave a concise and accurate
summary of the principles of interpretation that should
be utilized when attempting to construe a letter of credit.
A construction that will sustain an instrument will
be preferred to one that will defeat it; (Citations)
If an agreement is fairly capable of a construction
that will make it valid and enforceable, that construction will be given it. (Citations) The same
general principles which apply to other contracts
in writing govern letters of credit. (Citations)
Where a letter of credit is fairly susceptible of two
constructions, one of which makes it fair, customary, and one which prudent men would naturally
enter into, while the other makes it inequitable,
the former interpretation must be preferred to the
latter, and a construction rendering the contract
possible of performance will be preferred to one
which renders its performance impossible or meaningless. (Citations) Moreover, as between the beneficiary of the letter of credit and the issuer, if ambiguity exists, the words are taken as strongly against
the issuer as a reasonable pleading will justify. Id.
at 465, 466.
Clearly then in the instant case, even if Appellant
were to assert ambiguity or error in the letter of credit,
this Court should construe that letter of credit in favor
of the beneficiary as opposed to the issuer so that the
26
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basic commercial principles underlying letters of credit
will not be disrupted.
A similar result was reached in the case of Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Assn. v. Liberty
Bank & Trust, 116 F.Supp. 233 (D.C. Okla. 1953). In
establishing rules of interpretation and construction for
letters of credit the Court stated:
Although there is a line of authority which could
be interpreted to require that each "t" be crossed
and " i " be dotted by any and all banks dealing
with letters of credit and drafts negotiated thereunder, such an interpretation of this line of authority is improper. Certain practical considerations
must be taken into account in determining whether
the terms of the letter of credit have in fact been
met.
This Court frowns upon mere technical defenses
where in essence the contractual understanding between the parties has been met. Id. at 236.
Michie on Banks and Banking, Vol. p. 372, is in
agreement with the holding in both Venizelos S.A., supra,
and Bank of America, supra.
In determining the conditions of a bill of credit,
the ordinary rules governing this construction and
interpretation of writings, and especially commercial contracts are applied. This is a construction of a letter of credit as to the conditions precedent to payment of drafts is governed by rules applicable in ordinary commercial contracts. Accordingly, the bank's writings respecting a letter of
credit must be construed most strongly against it,
and must be construed so as to be reasonable and
consistent with an honest intent. . . . letters of
credit do not usually contain a direct promise to
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pay; but such promise is implied or inferred from
the statement that the credit has been established
and is irrevokable. Id. {Emphasis added}
As is clearly pointed out from the above authorities,
even if it were to be conceeded, that there was an ambiguity in, or failure to comply with, the letter of credit in
issue, that ambiguity, and/or noncompliance must necessarily be construed in favor of the Respondent. T o do
otherwise would have the untenable effect of unnecessarily and improperly restricting common commercial
practices and would cause many out-of-state extenders
of credit to refrain from extending such credit because
of fear that an accidental failure to comply with one of the
mere technicalities of the letter of credit would result in
the issuer's escaping liability and thereby place the entire financial burden and loss upon the out-of-state extender of credit. Such a result is not only undesirable but
highly improper.
It is Appellant's contention that there was not strict
compliance with the terms of the letters of credit. Respondent, while rebutting the arguments raised by Appellant, has demonstrated that there was in fact strict compliance with the terms of the letters of credit, based upon
the Appellant's employee's own admissions that the documents which were received under terms of the letter of
credit were considered as and identified by the bank's
employees as "sales drafts" or "drafts" and were paid as
such without objection by the bank. The record makes it
perfectly clear that Appellant and Respondent, by reason
of their continuous and unchanged course of conduct,
had agreed and consented to the procedure that the in28
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voices which Respondent submitted were sufficient to
qualify as drafts under each of Appellant's letters of
credit. The testimony given to the trial court and the exhibits offered and received support the conclusion that the
parties had agreed to a course of conduct which the Appellant now asserts was improper. Appellant should not
be allowed to alter the terms of an agreement which it
voluntarily entered into and which later proved not to be
in its best economic interests. Therefore, Appellant's
argument in Point III of its brief regarding strict construction of letters of credit is moot, such mootness arising
by reason of Appellant's own admission and own practices
which necessarily qualify the invoices (sales drafts) as
drafts under the terms of its letters of credit. Appellant,
by and through its officers, admitted in the record that the
bank's procedure in handling invoices and drafts was entirely the same in that the bank, upon receipt of invoices,
processed such just as it would process a draft which had
been received. The Appellant should not be allowed to
escape liability by raising a technicality and particularly
one which had never been brought to Respondent's attention during the entire period of Respondent's relationship
with Appellant.
POINT

V

THERE IS A PRESUMPTION T H A T THE
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS
CORRECT AND EVERY REASONABLE INT E N D A N T MUST BE INDULGED IN FAVOR
OF IT.
The trial court in its Findings of Fact concluded that
the Appellant had, by its actions for over a period of one
29
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year, waived strict compliance with the terms of the
letters of credit which it had isued. Appellant now asks
this Court to review the findings of the trial court and
claims those findings to be in error. It has consistently
been the practice of the Utah Supreme Court to review
with careful scrutiny the claim by any Appellant that the
trial court's decision was in error.
In the case of McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311,
241 P.2d 468 (1952) the Plaintiff brought an action
against the Defendant to recover under implied contract
for services rendered and expenses incurred by the Plaintiff in securing bidders on and buyers of machinery and
equipment sold for the benefit of Defendant at a sheriff's
sale. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the findings and that there was an
implied contract to pay for reasonable value of Plaintiff's
services. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the
Court stated that:
The Plaintiff having prevailed, is entitled to the
benefit of the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to him, together with every inference
and intendment fairly and reasonably arising therefrom. Id. at 469.
The case of Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d
277 (1952), summarizes the test followed by the Court:
Hence, if there is any competent evidence in the
record to support the Court's findings the judgment should not be disturbed. (Citations) This
principle is well stated in Jensen v. Gerrard, 85
Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070, 1072:
As this is a law action, the question is not
whether the evidence would have sup-
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ported the decision in favor of Appellants, but whether the decision made by
the trial court finds support in the evidence. If there is competent, credible
evidence to support the findings made by
the trial court, then those findings should
stand. Id. at 279.
A careful review of the record before this Court reveals a substantial amount of evidence in support of the
trial court's decision. It is the Appellant's burden to show
that the judgment of the trial court was incorrect and the
Appellant must overcome a presumption that the judgment of the trial court was correct and the burden of
affirmatively showing error is on the party complaining
thereof. (See Burton v. Zions Cooperative
Mercantile
Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514 (1952).
Appellant has not met this burden; it has only made
broad, all encompassing statements claiming that the
evidence presented to the trial court did not support the
trial court's findings and then arguing the trial court incorrectly aplied the law to the facts.
POINT

VI

THE TRIAL COURT'S USE OF THE
W O R D "WAIVER" T O DESCRIBE APPELL A N T S CONDUCT WAS CORRECT A N D
APPELLANT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY T O
REBUT ALL OF SUCH EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.
In response to Appellant's argument that the Court
erred in considering and deciding the case on a theory
which was not plead nor revealed to the parties until
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after the conclusion of the trial, it has been shown that
Respondent, in fact, had no duty to plead waiver as Appellant has claimed. Appellant is further incorrect in his
statement that there was no evidence offered on waiver.
The record is filled with evidence that Appellant's conduct as it applied to each of the letters of credit which it
had issued. It becomes quite clear upon a reading of the
record including the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law that the trial court used the term "waiver" to describe the sum total of Appellant's conduct which justified
the attaching of liability to Appellant. The issue of waiver
was also raised in Respondent's trial memorandum which
was submitted to the Court. Appellant, at this time, had an
opportunity to submit a reply memorandum to rebut Respondent's argument that Valley Bank & Trust was liable
under its letter of credit. Appellant had every opportunity
to submit evidence which would show that it did in fact
require strict compliance. Either that evidence does not
in fact exist or if it does, Appellant failed to introduce it
at the time of trial. Respondent, on the other hand, as
the record will reveal showed through the testimony of
bank officials that Appellant did not require strict compliance with the terms of the letter of credit.
For purposes of argument, even if it is assumed that
the trial court was in error in not informing the parties
that it would be relying on the theory of waiver to decide
the case, Appellant's argument is still doomed to failure.
In the case of Tree v. White, et al, 110 Utah 233, 171 P.2d
398 (1946), the Utah Supreme Court sets out to test as to
what would amount to a reversable error.
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W e direct our attention to the cross assignments
of error urged by plaintiff, for the reason that if
the trial court made erroneous findings we will not
reverse the judgment if the findings which should
have been made would support the judgment
entered.
A decision right in result will not be reversed even though the reason stated for
it is wrong. (Citations)
The Appellant may not prevail unless there has
been an error in the result as well as error in the
reasoning. Dayton Power & Light Company v.
Public Utilities Comm., 292 U.S. 290, 54 S.ct. 647,
652, 78L. ed. 1267. Id. at 399.
Applying this test to the case at bar, it becomes clear
that if we assume that the trial court based its findings
on the wrong reason, i.e. "waiver", the record clearly
reveals that Respondent was in fact entitled to judgment
in its favor by reason of Appellant's conduct, whether
that be labeled as "waiver" or an actual admission, together with the bank's advices which confirm Respondent's position that invoices were sales drafts which complied with the letter of credit.
In conclusion, for purposes of argument, it would
appear that the result which the trial court reached was
entirely correct and it is inconsequential whether the
reasoning utilized by the trial court in reaching that result was proper or improper.
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CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the authorities cited by Appellant
and the facts of the instant action that the trial court was
correct in entering judgment for the Plaintiff Titanium
Metals Corporation. Titanium had relied upon three
letters of credit issued by Respondent to insure payment
for goods which Titanium sold to Space Metals. Appellant, during the entire transaction took a security interest
in all of the titanium fines sold to Space Metals by Titanium to protect its interests in the transaction. Appellant's
claim that Titanium should not recover because it did not
follow normal banking procedures is incorrect inasmuch
as Titanium followed a procedure which Valley Bank
assented to and accepted without objection. Valley Bank
even paid with its own drafts all invoices submitted under
the first two letters of credit and the first purchase under
the third letter of credit. Valley Bank cannot now assert
that it is not liable to Titanium for the price of the goods
purchased by Space Metals under its third letter of credit.
The authorities cited in Respondent's brief support
the principle that waiver, in the instant action need not
be specifically plead by Respondent. The trial court was
correct in finding that Appellant waived strict compliance with the terms of the letter of credit in issue, such
finding being based entirely on the evidence presented at
the trial in support of Respondent's position that Appellant was liable under the terms of Appellant's letter of
credit. Appellant must be held responsible for its failure
to insist upon strict compliance with the terms of this
letter of credit and by reason of such conduct has waived
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any right to be relieved of liability because separate formal commercial drafts did not accompany the sales invoices. Technical objections raised by the issuer of the letter
of credit will not be sufficient to justify a conclusion that
the issuer should not be held responsible for payment
guaranteed by reason of its own letters of credit, the terms
of which were satisfied.
Even though it is Respondent's position that there
was strict compliance with the terms of the letters of
credit, as agreed upon by the parties, Appellant should
still not now be allowed to recover claiming ambiguity in
the terms of the third letter of credit because if in fact
there was ambiguity, that ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of Respondent, the beneficiary of the letter of
credit.
There is also a presumption that the judgment of the
trial court was correct and every reasonable intendment
must be indulged in favor of it. It is the Appellant's
burden to show that the judgment of the trial court was
incorrect and the burden of affirmatively showing error
is on the Appellant. It has not met this burden and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
The trial court's use of the word "waiver" to describe
Appellant's conduct was correct and Appellant had an
opportunity to rebut all of such evidence of conduct at
the time of trial or on motion at the conclusion of the
trial. Appellant failed to do so. Even if it is assumed that
the trial court based its findings on the wrong reason, the
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record clearly reveals that the Respondent was in fact
entitled to judgment in its favor by reason of Appellant's
conduct during the period in question. A decision right in
result will not be reversed.
From all of the above, we submit that the trial court
was correct in finding for Respondent and its judgment
should be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully Submitted,
ARNOVITZ, SMITH & NIELSON
ALVIN I. SMITH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondents
1305 J. C. Penney Building
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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